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THE ADEQUACY OF REMEDIES AGAINST
MONOPOLY UNDER STATE LAW
It is well known that the enactment of the Federal Anti-Trust
Act of I89o was largely induced by a prevalent belief that the
remedies obtainable under State law against what are commonly
known- as "monopolies" or "trusts," were inadequate.
At about the same time, that is in 1889, commenced the era
of State anti-trust legislation, in force in so many of the States.
It may be conceded that as matters now are, such legislation is,
generally speaking, without application to what is strictly com-
merce or transportation within the scope of the commerce clause,
conferring upon Congress what is (though not in terms) the
exclusive power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations and
among the several States." ' But this can doubtless be explained
as merely an application of the general rule that the exercise
of the power of Congress under such provision as here, by the
Act of 189o, excludes the exercise of any conflicting power
under authority of a State. Other illustrations are legislation
by way of regulation of immigration,2 and the Interstate Com-
merce Act.3
But it does not follow that State anti-trust legislation would be
equally ineffective in the absence of such legislation by Congress,
and it should be borne in mind that for nearly twenty years there
has been little or no opportunity to test the adequacy of such
legislation, with reference to the application of the commerce
clause.
Now, it is true that the power of Congress under such pro-
vision is, even in the absence of exercise thereof, exclusive of
any exercise of power of a State to legislate by way of direct
regulation of commerce within the scope thereof,4 at any rate
I See for instance: Hadley Dean Plate Glass Co. v. Highland Glass
Co., 143 Fed., 242 (C. C. A. 8th C. I9O6); State v. Virginia Carolina
Chemical Co., 71 S. C., 544, 559 (I9O5); Mooney Hardware Co. v. Good-
win Pottery Co., 120 S. W., IO88 (Tex. Civ. App. 19og).
2See People v. Compagnie Ginirale Transatlantique, io7 U. S., 5g,
63 (883).
3 See Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Hefley, I58 U. S., 98
(1895) ; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Detroit, Grand Haven, etc.,
Ry. Co., 167 U. S., 633, 642 (z897).
4 See, for instance, Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U. S., 251 (igo8).
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so far as concerns what have been called "matters national" as
distinguished from "matters of local interest." I But it is equally
true that the powers reserved to the States may be extensively
and validly exercised, though such commerce is thereby affected.
Thus it has been said: "The legislation of a State, not directed
against commerce or any of its regulations, but relating to the
rights, duties, and liabilities of citizens, and only indirectly and
remotely affecting the operations of commerce, is of obligatory
force upon citizens within its territorial jurisdiction, whether on
land or water, or engaged in commerce, foreign or interstate, or
in any other pursuit." 1
Now it is beyond dispute that the powers reserved to the States
include the power to enact anti-trust laws. 7 That is to say, the
States may prohibit the manufacture, sale, or transportation
wholly within their limits of any article, if involving such a re-
striction upon competition as to amount to a "monopoly" or
"trust." Under these conditions, is it likewise within the power
of a State to prohibit or otherwise regulate the transportation of
such article into the State, assuming the non-existence of the
Federal Anti-Trust Act or other anti-trust legislation by Con-
gress?
It also seems beyond dispute that, at least under certain condi-
tions, the power of a State to prohibit or otherwise regulate the
manufacture, sale, or transportation of an article, includes the
power to prohibit or otherwise regulate the transportation there-
of into the State. Thus, a State cannot, generally speaking, pro-
hibit the transportation of cattle into the State.8 But it may pro-
hibit such transportation of diseased cattle.9  So as to quarantine
See, for instance, Lcisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S., 100, lo9 (189o).
8 Shcrlock v. Alling, 93 U. S., 99, 104 (Oct., 1876). The court has
repeatedly quoted this language with approval. See PluImley v. Massachu-
setts, 155 U. S., 461. 473 (1894); Pittsburg & Southern Coal Co. v.
Louhana,-156 U. S., 59o; Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Kentucky,
161 U. S., 677, 701 (1896) ; Lilz v. Hesterbcrg, 211 U. S., 31, 42 (19o8).
7 Such legislation was sustained in Smiley v. Kansas, 196 U. S., 447
(1905) ; National Cotton Oil Co. v. State, 197 U. S., 115 (19o5) ; Carroll
v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 199 U. S., 401 (9o5); Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v.
Texas, 212 U. S., 86 (igog).
8 Railroad Co. v. tfusen, 95 U. S., 465 (Oct., 1877).
0 Reid v. Colorado. 187 U. S., 137 (19o2); Rasmussen v. Idaho, i81
U. S., 198 (i9O); Smith v. St. Louis & Southwestern Ry. Co., 18r U. S.,
248 (i9O); Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U. S., 251 (19o8).
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regulations preventing the transportation of persons.10 To the
same principle seems referable the imposition of restrictions upon
transportation into the State for the purpose of preventing fraud
or deception in sales, thus, of oleomargarine." So as to the
transportation of game for the purpose of exercising the "power
to preserve a food supply" which belongs in common to all the
people of the State.
12
Considered by themselves, these decisions seem to have been
rendered in analogous cases, and to furnish strong support for
the view that the power of a State to enact anti-trust laws in-
cludes the power to prohibit or otherwise regulate the trans-
portation of a monopolized article into the State. But it will
be objected that this view is contradicted by the well-known
decisions with reference to intoxicating liquors and oleomargarine.
Thus in Bowman v. Chicago, etc. Ry. Co.,18 Leisy v. Hardin."
was denied the power to prohibit the transportation of intoxicat-
ing liquors into the State. Undoubtedly some of the language of
the opinions therein is not to be harmonized with the view I am
here advocating. But my point is that on the facts they are in
entire harmony with such view, being sustainable on the ground
that as said in Leisy v. Hardin,5 the State cannot prohibit such
transportation of "any articles which Congress recognizes as sub-
jects of interstate commerce," it being denied that "whatever are
thus recognized can be controlled by State laws amounting to
regulations, while they retain that character." The same may be
said of Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania,8 where in holding in-
valid restrictions upon the transportation of oleomargarine, it
was said: "We think that what Congress thus taxes and recog-
nizes as a proper subject of commerce cannot be wholly ex-
cluded from any particular State." In this view there is no
necessary objection to the application of State anti-trust laws by
way of prohibiting or otherwise regulating transportation into
'0 Compagnie Francaise de Navigation v. Louisiana State Board of
Health, 186 U. S., 380, 387 (ixoa).
" Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U. S., 461 (1894).
12Lilz v. Hesterberg, 211 U. S., 31 (i9o8).
13 125 U. S., 465 (1888).
14 35 U. S., 100 (189o).
'5 p. 125. Compare as to tobacco, Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U. S., 343,
345 (xgoo).
16 171 U. S., i, 19 (WgS).
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the State of an article not recognized by Congress as a proper
subject of commerce.
Perhaps by the same rule it is within the power of a State to
prohibit monopoly in the business of transportation into the State,
as incident to its power to prohibit such monopoly of transporta-
tion within the State. This view may find support in Louisville
& Nashville R. R. Co. v. Kentucky,
1" where was sustained, as
applicable to a corporation engaged in interstate transportation,
a prohibition against the consolidation of parallel or competing
lines.
But if otherwise the power of a State to enact anti-trust laws
does not include the power to prohibit transportation into the
State, may not the obstacle be removed by Congressional legisla-
tion analogous to the Wilson Act of I89O, giving effect to State
legislation as to intoxicating liquors "upon arrival in such State ?"
This language has, indeed, been narrowed by judicial construc-
tion to arrival at the destination within the State, coupled with
delivery to the consignee.' But it may be that the provision
would be equally applicable if including arrival at the boundary
of the State. In this view, State anti-trust legislation would seem
to have reasonably ample scope.
But even if the view just advocated be untenable, and State
anti-trust statutes inapplicable to transportation into the State,
there yet remains in the States a vast source of power derived
from the principle established in Western Union Tel. Co. v. Call
Publishing Co.,'" that "the principles of the common law are
operative upon all interstate commercial transactions except in so
far as they are modified by Congressional enactments." Here
relief was held properly allowed in a State court against illegal
discrimination even in transportation within the scope of the
commerce clause. There seems no reason to doubt that the prin-
ciple is equally applicable to relief against monopoly, so that the
commerce clause of itself, in the absence of Congressional legis-
lation thereunder furnishes no objection to the allowance in a
State court of relief on common law grounds against transporta-
tion into the State under conditions of monopoly.
Whether criminal liability could be enforced by virtue of this
principle may not be entirely clear, though the opinion has been
17 I61 U. S., 677, 70, (1896).
"'See Heyman v. Southern Ry. Co., 203 U. S., 270 (i9o6).
19'181 U. S., 92 (19O1).
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frequently expressed that there exists on common law grounds,
liability for acts producing or tending to produce restrictions upon
competition.
2 0
But, however this may be, it seems reasonably clear that there
is available a remedy by way of injunction, on the application
of the attorney-general. Thus, in Stockton v. Central R. R. of
N. J., 21- relief was so granted against action tending to create a
monopoly in the business of transportation by railroad. Re-
cently the principle involved was carried even further in Mc-
Carter v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 22 where relief was so granted
against action by corporations engaged in the business of fire in-
surance under an agreement to fix rates, it being said that if such
agreement was "one that fixes rates and stifles competition, and
is detrimental to the public, and if injury has thereby resulted to
the public, the duty of a court of equity to enjoin the defendants
from continuing to act * * * is clear." Bearing in mind
what we have just seen to be established, that the principles of
the common law are operative upon all interstate commercial
transactions, it seems to inevitably follow that like relief would be
allowable by way of injunction in a State court against transpor-
tation into the State under conditions of monopoly. And it will
be observed that unlike the case of relief allowable under a State
statute, the relief now under consideration would doubtless be
allowable without reference to the existence of a monopoly in
sale, manufacture or transportation wholly within the State.
By way of summary, then it may be stated that in the view
herein taken, assuming the. non-existence of conflicting Congres-
sional legislation, the power of a State to enact anti-trust laws in-
cludes the power to prohibit or otherwise regulate transportation
into the State under conditions of monopoly; that even if this be
not so, by virtue of application of "the principles of the common
la'w operative upon all interstate commercial transactions" relief




20 Cooke on Combinations, Monopolies and Labor Unions, Sect. 163.
21 50 N. J. Eq., 52. (1892).
2273 AtI., 8o (N. J. Ct. of Err. & App., igog).
23 It will be recalled that this seems substantially the view advocated
by Judge Parker in the presidential campaign of i9o4.
